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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
INCORPORATED VILLAGE OF HEMPSTEAD, 
Employer, 
-and-




POLICE BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION OF 
HEMPSTEAD, INC., 
Intervenor. 
#2A - 6/7/79 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
CASE NO. C-1770 
CULLEN MD/.DYKEMAN,, :(GERARD EISHBERG, ESQ., of 
Counsel) for the Employer 
GEHRIG, RITTER, COFFEY, McHALE & McBRIDE (JOHN J. 
COFFEY, ESQ., of Counsel) for Petitioners and 
Intervenor 
Edward R. Graham and Vincent J. Marino filed a timely representation 
petition for a unit of policemen employed by the Village of Hempstead in the : 
ranks of Police Officer through Captain. At the present time, the policemen 
up to the rank of Lieutenant are in a negotiating unit that is represented by 
the Police Benevolent Association of Hempstead, Inc. (PBA). That organization 
moved to intervene in the instant proceeding and indicated its support for the 
petition. If the petition were granted, a new negotiating unit would be 
created consisting of all the titles currently in the negotiating unit repre-
sented by PBA and two positions of Police Captain currently filled by Graham 
and Marino. The showing of interest was executed by Graham and Marino only. 
^76 & 
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In his decision, the Director of Public Employment Practices and Represen-
tation (Directto^ .dismissed the petition on two grounds. The first ground is that 
it lacked a sufficient showing of interest, there being an indication of support 
for the petition by only two employees, Graham and Marino, in a proposed unit of 
approximately 90 employees. The second ground is that the petition was filed bj 
individuals and §201.2(a) of the Rules of this Board does not permit individual 
employees to file a petition for certification. 
Graham and Marino have filed exceptions to the decision of the Director. 
In their exceptions, they argue that the grounds relied upon by the Director 
for the dismissal of the petition do not apply to the instant petition because 
it is, in reality, an application for the accretion of Captains to the existing 
unit represented by PBA. They argue that since PBA supports the petition, 
they are the only employees whose interest would be affected by it and they 
have both executed the showing of interest. 
The petition herein is not an application for accretion. Accretion is 
a procedure for clarifying a negotiating unit by specifying the inclusion with-
in it of job titles that were implicitly within that unit when it was first 
defined. Thus, for example, a claim of accretion arises when an employer 
acquires an additional facility or when it creates new positions after the 
original unit was defined. The claim is that the original unit definition is 
sufficiently broad to encompass the employees working at the new facility or 
filling the new position. Because the negotiating unit is not changed, but 
only clarified, no new position or showing of interest is required. Here, how-
ever, we have no question of accretion. The position of Captain existed pre-
1 
viously and was excluded from the negotiating unit represented by PBA. The 
1 In 1976, PBA filed a petition to amend its negotiating unit to include the 
two Captains (C-1538). That petition was withdrawn for reasons not reaching 
its merits. Thereafter, Graham and Marino filed a petition for the creation 
of a separate Captains' unit (C-1558). That petition, too, was withdrawn 
for reasons not reaching its merits. 
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petition herein is for a change in, and not the clarification of a negotiating 
unit. Accordingly, it is subject to all the requirements of Part 201 of our 
Rules. The petition does not comply with these Rules and must be dismissed. 
NOW, THEREFORE, WE ORDER that the petition herein be, and it hereby is, 
dismissed. 
DATED: New York, New York 
June 7, 1979 
Ma^t>€£ £. //ju<« 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
David C. Randies, Memb 
Member Klaus did not participate. 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
: #2B - 6/7/79 
In the Matter of 
HEMPSTEAD HOUSING AUTHORITY, [ BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
Respondent, j CASE NO. U-3011 
-and- | 
LOCAL 307, SERVICE EMPLOYEES ] 
INTERNATIONAL UNION, AFL-CiO, [ 
Charging Party. ) 
BARATTA & SOLLEDER (BRUNO BARATTA, ESQ., 
of Counsel), for Respondent 
ISRAELSON, MANNING & RAAB (PERRY S. HEIDECKER, ESQ., 
of Counsel), for Charging Party 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of Local 307, SEIU, AFL-CIO 
(Local 307), from a hearing officer's decision dismissing its charge that the 
Hempstead Housing Authority (Employer) discriminated against three employees 
by discharging them because of their support of Local 307. The hearing officer 
concluded that the evidence did not establish that the discharge of any of the 
three employees was related to their support of Local 307. Accordingly, he 
dismissed the charge. 
In its exceptions, Local 307 argues that the hearing officer erred in 
the test that he applied for determining that there was no violation. It con-
tends that the hearing officer should have asked whether the discharge of the 
three employees was "inherently destructive of public employees' rights" and 
should not have asked whether the discharges would have occurred "but for" the 
employer's animus towards Local 307. It further argues that the hearing 
officer misread the record because the evidence compels a conclusion that .the 
three employees were discharged because of their support of Local 307. Speci-
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fically, it asserts that the decision to discharge the employees was made by 
Bernard Streifter, manager of the Employer, who had demonstrated some animus 
toward Local 307. Further, it asserts that this was done upon the advice of 
Aaron James, the supervisor of the discharged men, and that James had also 
demonstrated animus toward Local 307 while urging the employees to support a 
rival employee organization. 
DISCUSSION 
In reaching his conclusion that the discharge of the three employees 
was motivated by reasons other than their support of Local 307, the hearing 
officer relied upon the testimony of Streifter and James. At all critical 
points, the hearing officer credited the testimony of Streifter and James over 
inconsistent testimony of Local 307's witnesses. We find no basis in the 
record for rejecting the hearing officer's resolution of the witness credi-
bility issue. The record contains contradictions in the testimony of Local 
307's witnesses even to the point of whether James expressed support for or 
disapproval of the rival employee organization. 
Once the testimony of Streifter and James is credited over that of 
Local 307's witnesses, the weight of the evidence supports the hearing officer's 
conclusion that the three employees were not discharged because of their sup-
port for Local 307. Against that testimony, there is only suspicion and sur-
mise. Accordingly, we affirm the hearing officer's findings of fact. We also 
affirm his conclusion of law that the charge must be dismissed notwithstanding 
the assertion that the discharge of the three employees was "inherently 
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destructive of public employees' rights." The discharge of employees for 
reasons not related to activities protected by the Taylor Law is not destruc-
tive of Taylor Law rights. 
NOW, THEREFORE, WE ORDER that the charge herein be and hereby is 
dismissed. 
DATED: New York, New York 
June 7, 1979 
~^//sz+e<e/?/u± 'si^tf-rv*-" 
Harold R. Newman, Ghairman 
David C. Randies, Member 
Member Klaus did not participate. 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
GARRISON UNION FREE SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Employer, 
-and-
GARRISON EDUCATORS' ASSOCIATION, 
Petitioner, 
-and-
GARR.ISON TEACHERS' ASSOCIATION, 
Intervenor. 
VAN DE WATER & VAN DE WATER (JOHN M. DONOGHUE, 
ESQ., of Counsel), for Employer 
PAUL E. KLEIN, ESQ., (DEBORAH WATARZ, of Counsel), 
for Petitioner 
ANTHONY D. WILDMAN, for Intervenor 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of the Garrison Educators' 
Association (GEA), petitioner herein, to a decision of the Director of Public 
Employment Practices and Representation (Director) that there be a runoff 
election between GEA and the Garrison Teachers' Association (GTA) in a unit 
including all certified teachers of the Garrison Union Free School District 
(District). 
FACTS 
By its petition, GEA sought to represent the District's teachers, now 
represented by GTA. Among specific positions it sought to have excluded from 
the unit were supervisors and the District's vice principal, Tintle, who also 
is a full-time teacher. A hearing was held, but it was limited almost exclu-
sively to a contract-bar issue, although some testimony was offered as to 
Tintle's duties. There was no decision after the hearing because, after comple-
tion of the testimony, the parties agreed to hold an election in November in the 
GTA unit; that unit excluded supervisors, but not the vice principal. 
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The election was held on November 16, 1978j with the following 
results: 
Eligible Voters - 2 1 
Votes Cast 20 
GEA 10 
GTA 8 
Challenged Ballots 2 
The two challenges were made by GEA. It challenged the eligibility of two 
voters, Tintle, on the ground that she is a supervisor, and Burpee, on the 
ground that he is a confidential employee. Burpee is a full-time teacher who 
is also taking a college course leading to State certification in administra-
tion and supervision. In addition to teaching, he is serving an internship 
under the tutelage of the principal. 
The Director investigated the challenges, held a second hearing, and 
determined that both Tintle and Burpee were eligible voters. With respect to 
Tintle, he determined that her functions as vice principal included no super-
visory responsibilities. He further found that GEA had implicitly consented 
to her inclusion in the unit by withdrawing its proposal that the position of 
vice principal be excluded. He also determined that there was no evidence that 
Burpee assisted or acted in a confidential capacity to the principal in connec-
tion with any labor relations function. 
At this point, the Director authorized the opening of the two 
challenged ballots. As both were cast for GTA, resulting in a tie vote, he 
directed that there be a runoff election. 
EXCEPTIONS 
In its exceptions, GEA asserts that the Director erred in dismissing 
the challenges. It argues that the evidence supports a conclusion that Tintle is 
a supervisor and that Burpee is a confidential employee. It further argues that 
it never waived any right to litigate Tintle's unit placement. Finally, it argues 
5770 
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that the Director should not have opened the ballots until his determination 
was reviewed by this Board. 
DISCUSSION 
We affirm the Director's decision. First, as to Tintle, the evidence 
supports his determination that she is not a supervisor. This can be seen by 
evaluating GEA's allegations. 
1. Allegation: Tintle is introduced ;toboth staff and public as vice princi— 
pal, and has attended functions to which only administrators and board of edu-
cation members were invited. 
She has been introduced as vice principal, since she holds 
that extra-compensated position, but she is also a full-time 
teacher. The only evidence that she attends functions where 
only administrators and board of education members are invited 
is her testimony that she once attended a gathering to honor 
a retiring board member whom she had known for many years. 
There were former, although no current, teachers present. 
2. Allegation: Tintle is in charge of the school district when the principal 
is not in school. 
The principal testified that Tintle has two duties in his absence: 
(1) to call him if a problem arises and (2) to close school in 
bad weather. There has been only one occasion on which he 
could_-_ho;t fee reached by telephone. 
3. Allegation: Tintle can hire substitutes and promote aides. 
She does not hire substitutes; she calls them from a list. 
If a teacher is late, it is Tintle's duty to get someone 
into that class until the teacher or a substitute arrives. 
On occasion, when a teacher becomes sick, Tintle has asked 
her own aide — who happens to be a certified teacher — 
to go into the classroom while she tries to get a regular 
substitute. K^^ij 
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4. Allegation: Tintle gives permission for teachers to leave the 
building. 
Teachers do tell Tintle when they leave the building so 
that she can arrange for a substitute. Although one teacher 
testified that if the principal were absent she would ask 
Tintle- for permission to leave, there was no evidence that 
such permission-had to be requested. — 
5. Allegation: Tintle negotiates her own stipend. 
This is true. It had been covered by the collective 
agreement, but no longer is. GTA has not objected to 
the change. 
6. Allegation: In the absence of the principal, Tintle gives advice and 
direction on scheduling. 
On the one occasion when the principal could not be reached, 
some teachers had a question as to whether they were supposed 
to work under a new schedule. They asked Tintle, who suggested 
they do so. 
7. Allegation: Tintle has a role in the hiring of teachers. 
The record indicates that an applicant, Butcher, had been 
an aide to Tintle and two other teachers, all of whom were 
asked for their opinions. It further indicates that Tintle 
filled out a recommendation form on behalf of Toman, who, as 
a student aide, practice taught in Tintle's room. 
8. Allegation: Tintle has access to the principal's office. 
The record indicates only that she goes into his office to 
get standardized tests, which she is in charge of distributing. 
There was no testimony that other teachers do not enjoy the 
same access. 
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9. Allegation: Tintle distributes and requisitions audio-visual materials. 
Requisition forms are sent to her by teachers because she 
maintains a list of all the school's equipment. 
10. Allegation: Tintle chairs faculty meetings. 
She has chaired a faculty meeting, limited to completing 
State-required forms, because the principal was absent. 
11. Allegation: Tintle is the Title IX.compliance officer. 
She recalled the Title IX appointment, but did not know if she 
still had that assignment; she did not know what Title IX is. 
The record also supports the Director's determination that Burpee is 
not a confidential employee for the purposes of excluding him from representa-
tion under the Taylor Law. The evidence introduced at the hearing does not 
support a conclusion that he has assisted or acted in a confidential capacity 
to any managerial employee in connection with any labor relations function, or 
that he may reasonably be required to do so. 
Having ascertained that Tintle and Burpee are eligible to vote in 
the election, it is unnecessary for us to respond to the other exceptions made 
by GEA. 
NOW, THEREFORE, WE ORDER that a runoff election between GTA and GEA 
be conducted under the auspices of the Director. 
DATED: New York, New York 
June 7, 1979 
Li5-*2=f^s^ f* A/*. c£t^?-7<x^^_ 
Har.aldyR. Newman, Chairman 
Havid C. Randies, Member 
Member Klaus did not participate. 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
BOARD OF EDUCATION, KENMORE-TOWN OF 
TONAWANDA UNION FREE SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
and its Agent, DR. PHILIP TIEMAN, 
Superintendent of Schools, 
Respondent, 
-and-
KENMORE EDUCATORS ASSOCIATION,(NYEA/ 
NEA) , 
Charging Party. 
NORTON, RADIN, GELLMAN & GORDON (DAVID A. 
HOOVER, ESQ., of Counsel), for Respondent 
PAUL E. KLEIN, ESQ. (ZACHARY WELLMAN, ESQ., 
of Counsel), for Charging Party 
The charge herein was filed by the Kenmore Educators Association (KEA). 
It alleges that the Board of Education of the Kenmore-Town of Tonawanda Union 
Free School District and Philip Tieman, its Superintendent of Schools, 
(respondent) interfered with the organizational rights of public employees by 
denying KEA's request for access to faculty mailboxes and to the inter-school 
mail system. At present, the Kenmore Teachers Association (KTA), is the 
exclusive representative of respondent's teachers. It is stipulated by KEA 
and respondent that KTA and respondent are parties to a six-year agreement 
running from July 1, 1974 to June 30, 1980. Although no contracts between KTA 
and respondent were put in evidence, they are available to us; Section 214.1 of 
our Rules requires public employers entering into a written contract pursuant 
to the Taylor Law to file a copy of the contract with this Board. The contracts 
between KTA and respondent have been filed with this Board and we take official 
notice of them. There are two relevant contracts. One is a 1974-77 agreement; 
the other is a 1974-80 agreement. The second of the agreements was executed 
#2D - 6/7/79 
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on December 10, 1976. It is an amendment and an extension of the earlier 
three-year contract. 
Neither the original agreement nor its extension authorized KTA to use 
faculty mailboxes or the inter-school mail system. The bylaws adopted by the 
respondent board of education prohibit solicitation of employees on the 
employer's property without prior approval from the board of education and 
prohibit unreasonable commercial solicitation. In fact, respondent has per-
mitted KTA to use faculty mailboxes and the inter-school mail system for the 
distribution of organizational materials. It has also afforded mail system 
access to a credit union, to the parent-teachers association, to the United 
Fund, and to certain insurance companies authorized to sell annuities to 
teachers. On May 5, 1978, KEA requested respondent to afford it access to 
faculty mailboxes and the inter-school mail system for the distribution of 
organizational materials. The request was denied by respondent. It is that 
denial which occasioned the charge herein0 
A hearing officer dismissed the charge. He did so on the basis of his 
determination that KEA could not file a representation petition at any time 
proximate to May 5, 1978 and his conclusion that an employee organization is 
not entitled to use teacher mailboxes except at a time proximate to the time 
when it can file a representation petition,, For his conclusion, he relied 
upon our decision in Cheektowaga-Maryvale, 11 PERB 1(3080 (1978), (since 
affirmed AD2d [3rd Dept., 1979], 12 PERB 117009). 
KEA filed exceptions to the hearing officer's decision. Those excep-
tions allege that the hearing officer erred in that he failed to note three 
factors that distinguish:Cheektowaga-Maryvale from the instant situation: 
First, in Cheektowaga-Maryvale, the agreement of the incumbent 
employee organization granted it the privilege, albeit nonexclusive, 
of access to teacher mailboxes. Here, KTA enjoys no similar grant. 
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Second, unlike Cheektowaga-Mafyvale, here respondent. • 
promulgated a type of no-solicitation rule. That rule has 
been applied discriminatorily to the detriment of KEA. 
Third, a petition was timely on May 5, 1978 and, indeed, 
at all times after November 1, 1977 because, under §208.2 
of the Taylor Law and §201.3(e) of our Rules, the 1974-80 
contract could not bar a petition filed after that date. 
DISCUSSION 
We affirm the decision of the hearing officer. The right of KEA, a 
challenging employee organization, to access to employee mailboxes is not 
affected by or contingent upon any contractual provision granting access to or 
withholding such access from KTA, the incumbent employee organization. Neither 
is it significant that respondent's action in granting access to KTA and commu-
nity groups or in withholding access from them was taken pursuant to or in dis-
regard of a unilaterally promulgated no-solicitation rule. From the point of 
view of the Taylor Law, the treatment of the incumbent employee organization 
and community groups is irrelevant to the right of a potential challenger to 
have access to teacher mailboxes and the inter-school mail system. The Taylor 
Law affords public employees a reasonable opportunity to organize. It also 
affords public employers and recognized or certified employee organizations 
reasonable periods of stability during which to negotiate and to live under col-
lective agreements. On occasion, the interests of employees seeking to organize 
or to change organizations may come into conflict with the interests of public 
employers and recognized or certified employee organizations in maintaining 
stability. In such circumstances, an appropriate balance must be struck. In 
Cheektowaga-Maryvale and in Great Neck, 11 PERB 1(3039 (1978), we ruled that a 
public employer cannot interfere with employees' right of organization by 
denying an employee organization reasonable access to employee mailboxes at a 
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time proximate to the time when a representation petition may be filed, but 
that it can deny such access at other times. This ruling has been affirmed by 
the Appellate Division. 
We also affirm the ruling of the hearing officer that KEA could not file 
a representation petition at any time proximate to May 5, 1978. KEA argues 
that for the purposes of contract bar, the 1974-80 contract must be deemed to 
expire on June 30, 1977. Thus, under §201.3(d) of our Rules, a petition could 
have been filed during November 1976. If no petition were filed during that 
month, KTA would have until November 1, 1977 in which to negotiate another 
agreement. Having failed to do so, KEA thus contends that a petition would be 
timely pursuant to §201.3(e) of our Rules at any time after November 1, 1977 
until KTA and respondents negotiated a new agreement. According to KEA, the 
final three-year period of the six-year agreement would not bar any petition. 
There is support for this position in decisions of the National Labor 
Relations Board. Between 1958 and 1962 the National Labor Relations Board 
issued several opinions in which it ruled that where a collective agreement 
extends beyond the maximum period for purposes of contract bar, a challenging 
petition would be timely if filed either during the open period preceding the 
end of the contract bar period or at any time after the expiration of the brief 
1 
insulated period thereafter. However, if the parties enter into a written 
reaffirmation or extension of a long-term contract during the appropriate 
insulated period prior to the end of the contract bar period, or after the ex-
piration of the contract bar period but prior to the filing of a petition, that 
2 
extension would serve to commence a new contract bar period. 
1 E.g. Pacific Coast Assn. of Pulp and Paper Mfrs., 121 NLRB 990 (1958) ;Deluxe 
Metal Furniture, 121 NLRB 995 (1958); General Cable Corp., 139 NLRB 1123 
(1962). 
_2 See Pacific Coast, supra and Southwestern Portland Cement Co., 126 NLRB 931 
(1960) 
<J ( t I 
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We have found no explanation or rationale for the NLRB rulings 
between 1958 and 1962 that unless a long-term contract is reaffirmed or 
extended at an appropriate time it will have no effect as a contract bar 
after the original contract bar period has run. Perhaps the NLRB was con-
cerned that there would be uncertainty as to the precise anniversary dates 
of the contract and that a long-term contract could therefore renew itself 
withoutr a potential challenger""knowing" when it" could "f ile—xts" petition:. 
If so, that concern does not arise under the Taylor Law because, for purposes 
of contract bar, all contracts are deemed to be co-terminous with the fiscal 
year of the government involved. 
We are persuaded by the reasoning of the hearing officer in the 
instant case that the public policy underlying the contract bar rule is 
adequately served if a six-year agreement is treated as two three-year 
agreements for the purpose of contract bar. The presence or absence of a 
reaffirmation or extension is irrelevant to the policy that guarantees 
employees an opportunity to file a representation petition at least once 
every three years but not necessarily more often. That is the intent of 
§208.2 of the Taylor Law. Thus, we would affirm the hearing officer on the 
facts considered by him. We note, however, from the contracts between KTA 
and respondent in our file, that on December 10, 1976, respondent and KTA 
extended an earlier three-year agreement. That extension occurred during 
the appropriate insulated period near the end of the first three years of 
the contract and, therefore, even under the NLRB rule there would be a 
second three-year contract bar. 
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DATED: 
NOW, THEREFORE, WE ORDER that the charge herein be, and it hereby 
is, dismissed. 
New York, New York 
June 7, 1979 
Harold_R. Newman, Chairman 
, - - - - , . - Ps ^ V'-WU 
David C. Randies, Member 
Member Klaus did not participate. 
NEW YORK STATE PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
#2E - 6/7/79 
In the Matter of 
UNITED UNIVERSITY PROFESSIONS, INC., BOARD ORDER 
Respondent, 
Case Noc U-2951 
-and-
MORRTS ESON, ••-••• 
Charging Party. 
This Board having rendered a decision and order in this pro-
ceeding on August 23, 1978 determining that the agency shop fee 
refund procedures promulgated by the United University Professions, 
Inc. (UUP), were not valid and that, accordingly, the collection 
of agency shop fee.payments on behalf of the UUP constituted an 
improper practice in violation of Civil Service Law §209-a(2)(a), 
and, as the remedy for said violation, having directed revision 
in said refund procedure as the condition for continued collection 
of agency shop fee payments, and the UUP having submitted revised 
refund procedures, and this Board, by decision and order dated 
September 15, 1978, having approved said revised refund procedures 
upon the condition, among others, that said procedures will be 
implemented in an expeditious manner, and it appearing that the 
UUP may not be implementing said refund procedures in an expedi-
tious manner, and the charging party herein having requested 
further relief, 
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Therefore, this Board determines that an investigation should 
be instituted to determine whether the UUP.has failed to imple-
ment in an expeditious manner, or has otherwise failed to estab-
lish and maintain, an agency shop fee refund procedure as required 
by this Board's orders of August 23, 1978 and September 15, 1978, 
and whether the collection of all agency shop fee payments on 
behalf of the UUP should be terminated or other remedial relief 
granted, and it is 
ORDERED that the United University Professions, Inc. show 
cause at a hearing to be held on'Wednesday, June«. 27, 1979, at 10: 00'.AM 
at the offices of this Board, 50 Wolf Road, Fifth Floor, Albany, 
New York, why this Board should not order further remedies in this 
proceeding. 
DATED: New York, New York 
June 7, 197 9 
DAVID C. RANDLES, 
Member Klaus did not participate, 
5/o. 
STATE OF NEW YORK-. 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATK BOARD 
#2F - 6/7/79 
Case No. C-1868 
In the Matter of 
FALCONER' CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Employer, 
-and-
FALCONER SECRETARIAL AND CLERICAL UNIT. 
Petitioner. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the . 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in accord-
ance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, . 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the . 
Public Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that 
Clerical Unit 
the Falconer Secretarial and 
has been designated and selected by a majority of the employees 
of the above named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by-
the parties and described below, as their exclusive representa-
tive for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settle-
ment of grievances. 
Unit: Included: Clerk II, Typist, Account Clerk, Sr. 
and Stenographer. 
Account Clerk, 
Excluded: All other employees. 
Further, IT IS ORDERED that the tibove' named public 
employer shall negotiate collectively with the Falconer Secretarial 
and Clerical Unit 
and enter into a written agreement with such employee organization 
with regard to terms' and conditions of employment, and shall -; 
negotiate collectively with such employee organization in the ! 
determination of, and administration of, grievances. ! 
Signed on the 7th day of 
New York, New York 
June , 1979 
yla^j^f /€, A/&, 
H'a'ro/ldj X- Newman, Chairman 
/Uv r - ^ - ^ - y v ^ 
David C-7- 'Randies,.,* Member-
Member Klaus did not p a r t i c i p a t e ^ 
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